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LEADER’S ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPTION 
 - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE1 
 
 





We pretend to derive the effect of natural resources on leader’s attitudes and behaviors in 
deteriorated African economies. Through self-reported data from Northern Mozambique on 
leaders and households, we examine the effects on attitudes of corruption, appropriation of 
resources, trust and violence from the leader. We find that a resource discovery has a positive 
influence on leader’s proneness to corruption – paying bribes and ignoring the law –, especially, 
for the ones found during the leader’s tenure. The existence of resources also affects positively 
the leader’s idea of appropriation of rents, the trust in the community and the generosity in 
providing something to its community. 
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On the field of development economics, natural resources appear as one of the most 
frequent topics in the whole literature, mainly associated to the “natural resource curse” and the 
problems it brings to developing countries. As such, resource abundance has numerous 
implications in the economic and political system. Economically, Dutch disease thesis3 and 
slow growth are the main problems. Concerning the political system, the complications are 
mainly related to violence, conflict, democracy and corruption. However, developing countries 
are utterly dependent on these resources. 
In this paper, we want to contribute to the analysis of natural resource abundance in 
developing countries at a village-level. As a consequence of the scarce literature existent at this 
level, being the majority either connected to central power, political psychology or referent to 
the rural China and Indonesia, our goal is to provide a local focus at the Mozambique’s 
enumeration areas4 and their leaders’ behaviors and attitudes, while assessing conceivable 
solutions from Asian natural resource management programs and implemented projects. 
Our work is based on the investigation of the effects of natural resources, their 
abundance and shocks on the village leader’s behavior and attitudes towards corruption, 
especially. The effects on other behaviors as appropriation of resources, trust in the community 
and violence are also important to our study. Regarding resource shocks, we examine the 
difference between the effects on leaders already ruling the village when the last resource was 
found and leaders who just came into power after the latest resource was found. In the same 
way, we compare these effects with the ones on leaders who happened to be in villages with no 
resources found, in order to overcome the identification problem of not being able to randomize 
natural resources.   
                                                          
3 Badeed, 2017 explains it as an increase of domestic income and the demand for good through a natural resource 
boom which will generate inflation and appreciation of the real exchange rate 
4 Mostly referred in the paper as villages, as a matter of simplification. In Mozambique, locals do not refer to 
enumeration areas, only villages  
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Firstly, it is important to understand how the political context of Mozambique is and 
how it could affect the village’s functioning. This Southeast African country is governed by 
FRELIMO since 1977, two years after independence was reached. The FRELIMO Party ruled 
as a one-party state until 1990, while nowadays there is a multi-party system with RENAMO 
as major opposition. These two parties have already been in civil war for 1977-1992 and are 
now having conversations to guarantee the peace in the country. By ruling the country in a 
system of top-down nomination, the President of the Republic designates each Province 
Governor who suggests a name for each District Administrator whom should be accepted by 
the Ministry of State Administration and Public Function. The same process is used to nominate 
the Chief of the Administrative Post. Finally, the Chief of the Locality is nominated by the 
Governor of the Province after the suggestion of the Administrator of the District. The same 
happens to the Chief of the Village who is elected (alike an election of only one candidate) by 
the villagers after a nomination from the Administrator5. Therefore, the Chief of the Village is 
the formal leader, the representation of the State at local level and the person who has the main 
responsibility over the access to natural resources in his village’s territory.  
We use data from several surveys conducted in the province of Cabo Delgado, Northern 
Mozambique. This province is abundant in natural resources which remain unexploited. 
Recently, there are reports of starting extractions of graphite, marble, gold, ruby, natural gas6 
in the districts of Ancuabe, Balama and Montepuez7, mainly. That is to say, Cabo Delgado has 
a lot of potential to be investigated, particularly, the relation between leaders, the civil society 
and their territory, in order to understand how natural resource abundance can influence its 
management. Also, it represents a notable example to other regions, not only in Mozambique 
                                                          
5 This whole process of nomination is available in Decreto nº 11/2005, Boletim da República, I Série nº 23 de 10 
de Junho, that approves the Regulation of the Law of Local Bodies of the State 
6 Reserves that could place Mozambique as the 3rd largest exporter of liquified natural gas in the world. However, 
production of LNG is only expected to start in 2023. Possible to have more information here 
https://phys.org/news/2017-05-mozambique-gas-boom-threat.html  
7 Available to the location by district here http://www.cabodelgado.gov.mz/por/Ver-Meu-Distrito  
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but also in Africa, that are similar to Cabo Delgado, being rich in natural resources and having 
a deteriorated economic system and poor institutions.  
Through OLS regressions on leader’s attitudes and behaviors, we find that the existence 
of resources influences positively the generosity of the leader towards the community – through 
a dictator game – and increase the opinion that the leader should receive natural resource rents. 
This is in line with Caselli and Cunningham (2009) who state that a resource windfall brings 
more challenges to a leader simultaneously improving his budget constraint, allowing him to 
provide more quality to the people. The existence of resources in villages whose leader was 
already in power when the latest resource was found also has a positive effect on leader’s trust 
in the community, which according to Uslaner (1999) is positively related to more cooperative 
communities. 
We also find that leaders already ruling the village when the latest resource was found 
tend to behave more corruptly, being more prone to ignore the law and pay bribes. Thus, a 
shock on natural resources has a positive impact on the proneness of the leader to act corruptly. 
This concurs with the empirical evidence provided by Vicente (2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review 
on the “natural resource curse”, decentralization and leader’s behaviors. Section 3 provides the 
process of data collection. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy and a brief overview of 
our sample taking into account the estimation strategy and the division of villages by groups. 
Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 summarizes the results and presents policies and 
projects from other countries and Section 7 concludes with the suggestion of some policy 
implications. 
2 Literature Review 
Natural resources have become an important topic of study in the development field in 
the last few years, as many economists have been focusing on the “natural resource curse”, first 
5 
 
presented by Sachs and Warner (1995) as a negative correlation between natural resource 
dependence and GDP growth.  
Leite and Weidmann (1999) state corruption is already linked within the economic 
system due to the interaction between economic interests and policy instruments. Vicente 
(2010), in a natural experiment after the oil discovery in São Tomé and Príncipe, found a clear 
increase on perceived corruption on public services and allocations, supporting political and 
institutional resources curses. 
Caselli and Cunningham (2009) resorting to the natural resource curse, conclude that a 
resource windfall would bring new resolutions to the leader. Originally, it increases the 
probability of facing challenges to his control. On the other hand, it improves the government 
budget constraint. Thus, it could mean more spending on public goods. 
One of the solutions most mentioned in literature to solve this problematic is 
decentralization, mainly because it is believed that a natural resource centralized control system 
has a enormous impact on the sustainability of the resources and limits economic development 
(Schafer and Bell, 2002).  
To compare with other examples of decentralization, I resort to Mu and Zhang (2014) 
who presented the Chinese system of allocation of natural resources as a responsibility of the 
village leaders – two individuals, one elected by popular votes and the other, the CCP secretary, 
appointed by the upper-level government, with one committee each. In fact, the majority of the 
decisions are taken in the villagers’ committee meeting, led by the village leader, the one 
responsible to travel to county seats in order to get money for the village through lobbying. 
Moreover, another paper focusing on Chinese village leaders was presented by Kennedy 
et al. (2004) that shows the difference between open and closed (unfair) elections. The foremost 
are more accountable to the villagers and its decisions are representative of their preferences. 
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Nevertheless, party nominated leaders’ decisions are perceived as less fair and occasionally are 
used to personal gain by increasing their own assets (Bernstein and Lu, 2000).  
Keuleers et al. (2009) also present some cases in Asian countries: Thailand and its top-
down approach shaped by the indigenous rights; India and its locally tailored solution by 
allowing the villagers to benefit from their management in local forest. Nonetheless, the same 
paper warns that decentralization alongside with a weak central control will lead to vast 
corruption in the benefits given to the local authorities. 
In particular, Mozambican government provides the local authorities of towns and 
villages with the power to rule their own territory. According to the law8, a joint responsibility 
between the central state and the local bodies should exist. In conclusion, Saide (2015) 
advocates that the work of community leaders is vital to keep the party-state, in the case of 
Mozambique, FRELIMO, close to the population, a way to keep the electorate faithful.  
In the same way, Schafer and Bell (2002) offers a good presentation of the Mozambican 
case. The country is facing the problem of having a party-state for many years. Consequently, 
the move to a decentralized system has been difficult to accomplish in areas more sympathetic 
to the opposition. 
As mentioned in the introduction, in Mozambique, the village leader has relevant power 
to rule the access to the natural resources within its territory, being able to ask for a value, 
denominated, the “village tax” as a counterpart for the exploration of the land.  
Therefore, this local body has an advantage over the ones who show interest in 
extracting some resource. That is to say, the leader will assume a bargaining position along the 
other part who has the desire to use the territory. On the contrary, the firm who wants to set 
production will also assume a bargaining position along the government body because it 
possesses the required capital to perform the exploration of the resources. In the future, this 
                                                          
8 Lei 3/94 de 13 de Setembro and Lei 2/97 de 18 de Fevereiro from the Republic of Mozambique   
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leading position will remain due to the risk of exposure – it is difficult and expensive to replace 
the exploring firm (Tarzi, 1991). 
Furthermore, the collection of resource rents is not only a desire of the leader to keep 
extracting resources, which eventually lead to an inefficient point because the leader fails to 
discount the future too much (Robinson et al., 2006), but it is also frequently correlated to 
conflict and corruption, weakening the political system and its institutions (Iimi, 2007). 
Lastly, regarding the category of trust, Uslaner (1999) stated that higher levels of social 
trust are positively correlated to more cooperative communities. The performance of the 
community is influenced by governmental accountability (Knack, 2002).     
Due to the scarce literature at the village leader-level, some important questions about 
the decentralization and the role of the village leader are still unanswered.    
3 Data 
The data used to support this study was collected from from endline village’s chief9 
surveys conducted by field teams10, recruited and trained by NOVAFRICA11 for a main 
research project12, in 207 enumeration areas of the province of Cabo Delgado. The baseline 
surveys run between August and September 2016 and the endline took place in the period from 
4 August to 10 November 2017.  
3.1 Sampling 
The data collection process has already been established in the baseline with a random 
selection of 207 communities from 16 of the 17 districts of Cabo Delgado - Ibo district was 
dropped because it is composed by several islands. As Ruzzante (2017)13 explained, 
                                                          
9 Also mentioned in the paper as “leader”, as a matter of simplification due to local insights 
10 Field teams composed by 5 interviewers and 1 supervisor. The first ones conducted the household’s survey (2 
for each one, per village) while the supervisor was responsible for the community’s and the leader’s survey. 
Surveys were submitted in Portuguese in an electronic device – a tablet –, though the interviewers conducted them 
mainly in the local dialect (Macua, Maconde and Mwani).  
11 Knowledge center created by the Nova School of Business and Economics of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
12 For more information visit: http://novafrica.org/research/on-the-mechanics-of-the-natural-resource-curse-
information-and-local-elite-behavior-in-mozambique/  
13 Work Project with data extracted from the same main research project. Similar explanation of the data collection 
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communities were identified through areas of polling registered in 2009 and 2014 Mozambique 
general elections and then, stratified into three groups: urban, semi-urban and rural.  
From the baseline to the endline, one community was excluded. Regarding the leaders’ 
survey – conducted by the supervisor of the field team –, we decided to keep the leaders who 
have been replaced in the meanwhile period given they were the ones also interviewed in the 
baseline and we, thus, consider their opinion more important than recently elected ones. 
However, 3 leaders were dropped from the analysis – either they have died or were replaced 
and abandoned the village. All in all, we conducted the analysis of this study with 203 leaders 
from the same number of communities.  
To complete our analysis, two other surveys were used: household and community. The 
first one was conducted to 10 individuals, representing each one its household. The interviewed 
should be the household head, be 18 years old or more and should be available to be interviewed 
one year later. The field teams started at the polling station (usually the center of the village or 
some infrastructure, a primary school, a meeting room or the village chief’s house) and headed 
in 5 different directions, in an interval of distance already defined for the voting population of 
each village. This survey included a wide variety of demographic, socioeconomic and social 
capital questions, finishing with economic games14 played by the 10 individuals and the leader 
together. The community survey was conducted with 5 people from the village chosen by the 
leader, usually influent people and those with a position in the village management. This survey 
included questions related to resources, public infrastructures and services. 
3.2 Survey Design 
The leader’s survey is composed of some variables to measure demand for political 
accountability, perception of corruption, rent-seeking behavior, the role of the villagers in the 
village sphere and social trust.  
                                                          
14 Game theory experiments 
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Some of the questions have two possible answers – declaration A and declaration B with 
values 1 and 2 – to understand how much the chief are prone to be corrupt. Regarding the 
questions used in the estimation strategy, the answers take value 2 when: it is better to ignore 
the law to have a quicker solution; sometimes violence is necessary to defend a cause in 
Mozambican politics and the best way to overcome difficulties is paying bribes. 
On the other hand, the variables for trust, mainly the ones that respect relations with 
other people, are asked with a scale from 0 to 3 that interviewers referred to by means of 
language qualifiers (e.g., “Nothing”, “Trust a little”, “Trust”, “Trust a lot”). However, some 
trust questions – frequency of lending money and frequency of leaving a good unattended in 
public – have 5 levels of answer. In this case, the interviewer referred to the scale of 0-4 as 
“Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes a year”, “Every month”, “Every week”. 
The remainder set of questions were asked in a two-stage process to get a more accurate 
answer: first, the basic scale of “disagree”, “agree” and “neither disagree nor agree” was 
presented with numeric answers from 1-3, respectively. If the interviewee had chosen one of 
the two first options, the interviewer asked about the intensity of its answer to get a final scale 
from 1-5 (respecting the order of “strongly disagree”, “partly disagree”, “neither agree nor 
disagree”, “partly agree” and “strongly agree”).  
Finally, the dependent variables related to game theory were numerical. Most answers 
vary from 0-10, noting that the one we use goes from 0 to 300 measuring the value the leader 
is willing to allocate to an individual from the community.  
4. Identification strategy 
The goal of this section is to describe how the estimation strategy in this study is helping 
find reliable results to explain the leader’s attitudes. To start, a multiple OLS regression was 
used.  
(1) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙′𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐿′𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡′𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, 
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where 𝑦𝑖 is the outcome of interest, a vector of variables of trust, appropriation of resources, 
attitudes of violence and perception of corruption, 𝑖 is the identifier of each enumeration 
area/village, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 is a variable of total number of resources
15 in the enumeration area, provided 
by the community survey, 𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙′𝑖 is a vector of enumeration area characteristics
16, 𝐿′𝑖 is a vector 
of leader’s characteristics17, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡′𝑖 is a vector comprehending the 16 districts dummies, 𝑢𝑖 is 
the error term. 
The variables used as dependent are already mentioned above. The ones with two 
declarations choice are related to the perception of corruption and attitudes of violence. In terms 
of trust, we built an index of proportions with trust variables on family and neighbors and 
frequency variables equally aforementioned. Finally, for the appropriation of resources, we 
used a variable from the two-stage process of agreement that takes the maximum value if the 
leader thinks he deserves a part of the rents of natural resources and the numeric variable from 
the game theory experiment. In this first regression, the main outcome of interest will be 𝛼1 to 
assess if the existence of natural resources has some influence in the leader’s attitudes. 
Later, more variables are added to improve the analysis. As mentioned before, we 
thought that the behavior of the leader could be influenced by resource shocks so, in the next 
regression (2) we added a dummy (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖) for villages where the leader was in power when the 
latest resource was found and a dummy (𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑖)  for villages when the latest resource found was 
before this leader came into power. The coefficients of interest will be 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and 𝛼3. In 
regression (3), we dropped these two dummies and added an interaction variable (𝐷𝑢𝑟_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖), 
that multiplies the number of resources by the dummy 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖, to realize if the number of 
resources in this type of villages has a different impact on the leader’s behavior. The coefficients 
                                                          
15 Excluding river and forest for the number of resources, because we want resources that were found and not the 
ones that have always been there 
16 Variables related to the development of the enumeration area/village and its villagers and its division between 
stratified groups  
17 Religion, ethnicity, number of assets, education, born in the village and how many years he has been in power  
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of interest will be 𝛼1 and 𝛼2. In order to construct these variables, we had to divide our sample 
of enumeration areas into three different groups: (1) villages with no resources, (2) villages 
with resources with the latest one being found during the current leader’s mandate and (3) 
villages where the latest resource found was before the current leader came into power. 
(2) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙′𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐿′𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡′𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖. 
(3) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑢𝑟_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙′𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐿′𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡′𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖. 
All regressions use robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity.   
4.1 Sampling Overview 
To have a small glimpse on the characterization of our sample of leaders, a table was 
constructed18 isolating leaders by group of villages. The main characteristics of the leaders 
interviewed are: male gender, married, Islamic religion and Macua ethnicity. On average, a 
leader is 55,5 years old, has 6,35 years of education, has a quantity of assets19 of 5,77 assets 
and has been in power for 8,69 years. It is important to present that the percentage of leaders 
born in the village they are ruling is above 70% in groups (1) and (2) but it is nearly 50% in 
group (3) – where the latest resource being found was before the leader came into power. Also, 
the average number of years in power differs significantly from group (2) with a value of 10,7 
years to 5,4 years in group (3). 
5. Results 
This section shows the OLS estimates of the effect of resources and resources-related 
variables on leader’s attitudes. For each table, results are organized into six columns: the first 
two are related to regression (1) from estimation strategy, columns 3-4 are related to regression 
(2) and the last two columns to regression (3). Village controls and district dummies are always 
included. However, leader controls are only included in even columns.  
                                                          
18 Table A – Leaders’ Characteristics, available at Annex 
19 List of personal assets determined on the survey – total value of 15 assets 
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Starting with corruption-related variables, Table B.1 displays the results on if it is best 
to ignore the law to get a faster solution. It suggests that a resource shock, in this case, 
discovering the last resource found during the leader’s tenure, will affect positively and with a 
10% significance-level the perception of the leader to ignore the law in order to get a quicker 
result. However, this finding is only significant when leader controls are excluded. Similarly, a 
resource found during leader’s tenure have a significant (5% level) and positive impact on the 
perception of the leader that paying bribes is the best way to overcome problems20.  
Regarding the topic of trust21, there is a significant impact (10% level), when leader 
controls are not added, of the interaction variable 𝐷𝑢𝑟_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 – product of the number of 
resources and the dummy variable 𝐷𝑢𝑟 that takes the value of 1 if the leader was in power when 
the latest resource was found and 0, otherwise. This coefficient is positive, meaning natural 
resources have a bigger impact on the level of trust of leaders who were already in power when 
the last resource was discovered than leaders who came into power after the last resource was 
found.  
With respect to the appropriation of resources we base our analysis in two different 
variables: dictator game amount22 and agreement related to the collection of resource rents. The 
results show significant and positive impacts on the amount given to someone from the 
community regarding the number of resources existent in the village (5% level). When adding 
tenure variables, with leader controls excluded, the coefficient remains significant (this time, at 
a 10% level). Thus, natural resource abundance affects positively the generosity of the leader, 
through this experiment. In the same way, resource abundance affects positively the opinion 
                                                          
20 Available at Table B.2 
21 Results shown at Table C 
22 300 MZN were given to the leader. He had the choice to give part of this value to someone, randomly selected, 
from the community. The chosen person does not know where this money came from. The values vary from 0 to 




that the leader should receive natural resource rents (10% level)23. Also, villages with the latest 
resource being found before the leader came into power have a higher coefficient on this 
variable (with a 5% level including village controls). A positive coefficient can also be seen 
regarding villages where the latest resource was found already during the leader’s tenure. 
However, it is only significant at a 10% level when village controls are not included. These 
results suggest a similarity between the leaders that happened to be in villages that found 
resources – groups (2) and (3).  
Finally, there is no significant impact of natural resources on leader’s opinion towards 
violence. 
6. Discussion 
In this section, we will summarize the results shown above and advance some reasons 
on why variables behave this way. Together, we will link the results with possible solutions, 
given from the literature. 
Primarily, the main goal was to derive the effect of natural resources existence on 
leader’s attitudes. We have seen that resource abundance increases the generosity of the leader. 
Also, leaders think they should receive a part of the natural resources rents when there are more 
resources in their territory, which becomes clear if the leader will afterwards spend these rents 
on an improvement for the village.  
Furthermore, the division of villages into distinct groups and consequently, the creation 
of tenure variables brought some interesting findings to our analysis. First, in villages with 
resources, no matter when they were found, the leader thinks he deserves a part of the natural 
resources rents. Then again, leaders ruling a village that found a resource during his tenure are 
more prone to be corrupt – being more willing to ignore the law and pay bribes to overcome 
difficulties.  
                                                          
23 Results shown at Table D.2 
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Finally, analyzing the effect of the interaction variable, it is evident a great positive 
impact of the existence of resources upon leaders who were in power when the latest resource 
was found. Thus, the resource shock improves positively the relation with the community he is 
ruling. 
Excluding the topic of appropriation of resources, these insights show a very similar 
pattern between leaders who happened to be in villages with resources and those who belong 
to villages with no resources found.  
Overall, the outcomes advise taking a look at Keuleers (2009), a paper that presents 
some projects24 with management of the natural resources administered by local authorities and 
others by citizens. The example of Madagascar’s forest management given by McConnell 
(2005) is also captivating, the legislation allowed the government to sign agreement with the 
communities for the management of the forests. The ones that are standing out are those where 
the government has a partnership with development organizations.  
7. Conclusion 
We reckon our results do not have a strong power due to some limitations. First, the 
sample is small, especially, the number of villages where the latest resource found was before 
leader’s tenure. Nor are we able to randomize natural resources and there is no information on 
their importance, wealth nor quantity so we can derive whether resources’ characteristics 
differently influence their effect on leader’s attitudes. Moreover, from Table A we can notice 
that from group (3) of villages almost 50% of the leaders are not born in the village and the 
average years in power are 5,4 – numbers much smaller comparing with other groups – which 
restricts the analysis on the effects of natural resource abundance. Finally, all the data is self-
                                                          
24 Thailand including the views of indigenous, India giving forest benefits to the ones who are managing it and 
UNDP projects in other Asian countries that involve citizens to perform the monitoring and evaluation of the 
delivery of public services 
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reported. Thus, we ought to be careful in the analysis, expressly because it was the community 
who reported the existence of resources in its territory. 
Our analysis gives results in line with a decentralized policy of management of natural 
resources. From the results, we know that resources influence largely the perception of the 
leader. While it is commonly believed he should receive rents from the exploration, those 
earnings can later be transformed into public goods to the community due to the generosity that 
leaders show in the presence of resources, combined with the fact that a resource shock 
positively influences the leader’s trust in its community.   
Furthermore, it is important for central power to be aware of the problems that a natural 
resource shock can bring to the community through the increase on the tendency of the leader 
to act corruptly. The results state clearly that leaders contemplate that the best way to overcome 
a problem is paying bribes. So, according to Iimi (2007), developing countries should be linked 
to good regulation and anticorruption policies, in this case, policies capable of acting at a local 
level with the collaboration of village’s leaders. 
These findings can be relevant to other resource-rich regions with weak economic, 
political and institutional systems, alike Cabo Delgado. We suggest a more decentralized 
system for the management of natural resources with tight supervision over not only recent 
discoveries but also the presence of firms that are extracting the resources in order to improve 
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Table A - Leaders’ characteristics 
 
 




Village where the last 
resource found was 
during leader's tenure  
Village where the last 
resource found was 
before leader's tenure  
Male (%) 96,36% 100% 100% 98,03% 
Average age 54,61 56,44 57,4 55,52 
Married (%) 80,91% 83,33% 93,33% 82,76% 
Average education (years) 6,39 6,5 5,2 6,35 
Muslim (%) 51,82% 67,95% 53,33% 58,13% 
Christian (%) 43,64% 32,05% 40% 38,92% 
Macua (%) 59,64% 87,18% 46,67% 66,01% 
Maconde (%) 33,64% 11,54% 40% 25,62% 
Mwani (%) 5,45% 0% 13,33% 3,94% 
Born in the village (%) 71,82% 79,49% 53,33% 73,40% 
Rural 77,27% 88,46% 86,67% 82,27% 
Semi-urban 11,82% 8,97% 13,33% 10,84% 
Average assets 6,08 5,44 5,13 5,77 
Average years on power 7,77 10,7 5,4 8,69 











Table B.1 - Perception of corruption  
 “Ignore the law for a quicker solution” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources 0.0118 0.014 -0.0093 -0.0006 0.033 0.0363 
 (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.006) (0.0073) (0.0251) (0.0237) 
During leader's tenure   0.0873* 0.0588   
   (0.0457) (0.0408)   
Before leader's tenure   0.119 0.1078   
   (0.0746) (0.0772)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     -0.0231 -0.0241 
     (0.0235) (0.022) 
Observations 198 191 198 191 198 191 
R-squared 0.1869 0.26 0.2120 0.2754 0.1893 0.2625 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 















Table B.2 - Perception of corruption     
 “The best way to overcome problems is paying bribes” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources -0.0139 -0.0172 -0.0438 -0.0427 0.0298 0.0179 
 (0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0567) (0.0573) 
During leader's tenure   0.1474** 0.1417**   
   (0.0696) (0.0708)   
Before leader's tenure   0.0893 0.0588   
   (0.1004) (0.1015)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     -0.0476 -0.0379 
     (0.0548) (0.0569) 
Observations 199 192 199 192 199 192 
R-squared 0.2870 0.3435 0.3064 0.3595 0.2909 0.3458 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 















Table C – Trust in the community     
 Trust index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources 0.0129 0.0237 -0.0146 -0.0046 -0.1008 -0.0992 
 (0.0677) (0.0696) (0.0804) (0.0299) (0.0774) (0.0947) 
During leader's tenure   0.1912 0.2314   
   (0.1301) (0.1407)   
Before leader's tenure   -0.1476 -0.2242   
   (0.1623) (0.1714)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     0.1238* 0.1328 
     (0.0714) (0.0912) 
Observations 201 194 201 194 201 194 
R-squared 0.3548 0.3903 0.3721 0.4173 0.3621 0.3984 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 















Table D.1 – Appropriation of resources      
 Dictator game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources 7.5739** 7.0395** 7.356* 6.3247 1.9121 5.1327 
 (3.3382) (3.2723) (4.2445) (4.0695) (6.4602) (7.6851) 
During leader's tenure   0.61 0.8788   
   (11.408) (12.6822)   
Before leader's tenure   2.515 13.3077   
   (12.4708) (14.0948)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     6.1681 2.0605 
     (6.1827) (7.4833) 
Observations 201 194 201 194 201 194 
R-squared 0.2305 0.2863 0.2306 0.2897 0.2335 0.2866 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 











Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 













Table D.2 – Appropriation of resources      
 Agreement on “Should the leader receive natural resource rents” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources 0.1963* 0.1848* 0.0448 0.0858 0.2347 0.3738 
 (0.1094) (0.1095) (0.1286) (0.1358) (0.3035) (0.3223) 
During leader's tenure   0.6214* 0.2948   
   (0.3514) (0.3773)   
Before leader's tenure   0.9524* 1.1911**   
   (0.547) (0.5466)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     -0.0419 -0.2042 
     (0.2915) (0.3105) 
Observations 200 193 200 193 200 193 
R-squared 0.2483 0.3143 0.2693 0.3357 0.2484 0.3168 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table E – Leader’s attitude toward violence 
 “Sometimes, violence is necessary to defend a cause” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Resources -0.0015 -0.0033 -0.0077 -0.0019 0.0006 -0.0347 
 (0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0153) (0.0175) (0.0299) (0.0243) 
During leader's tenure   0.0127 0.01   
   (0.0588) (0.0749)   
Before leader's tenure   0.0468 -0.0607   
   (0.0899) (0.0673)   
During leader's 
tenure*Resources     -0.0025 0.0357 
     (0.0289) (0.0264) 
Observations 189 182 189 182 189 182 
R-squared 0.1356 0.2449 0.1369 0.2476 0.1356 0.2473 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS. Controls on leader characteristics are only included in even 
columns. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
